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Recurrent civil conflict has blocked
progress toward improving health in
Somalia. Violent power struggles between
political factions followed the breakdown
of the government in 1991. Large num-
bers of civilians were displaced and
warlords diverted food aid. In response, a
United States-led military intervention
attempted to facilitate access for human-
itarian relief. While armed forces clashed
in Mogadishu, food distribution was dis-
rupted and famine continued in the south.
United Nations (UN) peacekeepers fol-
lowed but were unable to restore order. Of
the ensuing period, Alex de Waal wrote
that ‘‘centralized political authority has
never reemerged’’ [1].
Warfare erupted again in 2006 between
the transitional government and insurgents
in the southern and central regions, with
pockets in Baidoa and Mogadishu under
government control [2]. Ethiopian troops
entered to quell threats to the border and
reinstate the government. UN and African
Union peacekeepers also arrived, but were
declared to be enemies of the Islamist
movement [3]. From 1997 to 2005,
Somalia surpassed Sudan, Afghanistan,
and Iraq in reports of attacks against aid
workers [4]. The UN and many nongov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) now op-
erate remotely from Nairobi.
The election of a new president and
reformulation of parliament in 2009 brings
renewed optimism for stabilization. Yet
Somalia remains a fragmented region
consisting of two effectively independent
states (Puntland and Somaliland), a small
area governed by transitional authorities
and the greater part overseen by Islamist
groups.
We believe that the stark lack of
humanitarian space and current insecurity
has now undermined the impact of
humanitarian assistance in Somalia, a
country where half of the population is
dependent on health relief and food aid.
The government has been unable to
implement the rule of law, and external
aid constantly faces the threat of diversion.
Moreover, inter-clan politics ensure that
humanitarian engagement remains com-
plex. Sections of the population have been
left to deal with the devastating conse-
quences without adequate access to aid.
In this essay, we use field data to
demonstrate that geographic segments of
the population have chronically faced severe
vulnerability and are now facing health
threats to their survival. Without the prior-
itization of basic but crucial public health
interventions and negotiated access to food
aid, we expect the situation to worsen.
Navigating a Complex
Humanitarian Environment
A little over a million people have been
internally displaced since fighting resumed
in 2006. The Food Security Analysis Unit
of Somalia (FSAU) closely monitors live-
lihoods, and estimates 3.25 million in need
of the most basic emergency food aid [5],
a 77% increase since early 2008. The
UN’s Consolidated Appeal Process is now
seeking assistance for nearly half of the
population [6]. While the world’s media
has focused on the rampant piracy in the
Gulf of Aden where oil tankers are seized,
basic food aid is in danger of diversion
every day. During August 2008 when sea
escort for the World Food Program was
unavailable, only 9,500 of the required
30,000 metric tons of food aid were
delivered, causing major delays and impact-
ing over one million persons [7]. Further
threats of crop failure, drought, flooding,
and escalating food prices are omnipresent.
Mortality as an Indicator of
Humanitarian Need
The absence of central governance
means that vital registration systems have
ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the scale of
the conflict’s impact on civilians must be
monitored in order to identify where
humanitarian needs are most pressing.
UNICEF’s national survey of 2005 high-
lights the dangers already faced by chil-
dren with a demographic mortality rate of
135 deaths per 1,000 children under the
age of five years [8]. This is well above
rates in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya.
With only 29% of Somali children under
two years of age immunized against
measles, this is no small wonder.
Death rates have become widely used as
an indicator of the impact of violent events
on civilian populations and the progress of
humanitarian operations. Retrospective
mortality surveys, many conducted by
the FSAU and NGOs, give insight into
the impact across geographic regions of
Somalia. The measures used are crude
death rates (CDRs), defined as deaths per
10,000 midterm population per day; and
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deaths per 10,000 midterm children under
5 years of age per day. Although mortality
surveys conducted by relief agencies dur-
ing humanitarian crises are not reviewed
by institutional review boards, they must
adhere to informed consent protocols
[9,10].
To assess mortality trends, we examined
CDRs and U5DRs since 2002. Death
rates were reported in mortality surveys
conducted among displaced persons and
residents at different geographic levels:
camps for displaced persons, cities, dis-
tricts, provinces, and livelihood zones of
nomadic communities. We have adjusted
the dates to reflect the midpoint of the
mean recall period for which deaths were
recorded (the recall periods for four
surveys were not reported and therefore
charted by the end dates). We graphed
results by time and mapped the most
recent results by the geographic level
represented by the survey.
These surveys represent the collection of
mortality surveys compiled in the Complex
Emergency Database (CE-DAT; http://
www.cedat.org/) [11]. CE-DAT was initi-
ated in 2003 to compile and standardize
data on mortality and nutrition of popula-
tions affected by complex emergencies and
to improve evidence-based policy on con-
flict prevention and response. Sample
surveys are added to the database after
the completeness of the report and the
quality of the methodology are assessed.
Mortality Data across Time and
Space
For mortality results with respect to
time, we charted death rates among three
regions (southern, central, and other
regions) and noted the eruption of intense
fighting in early 2006 (Figures 1 [CDR]
and 2 [U5DR]). Comparisons of death
rates over time from the conflict-affected
south (defined as the region south of
Galgadud and identified by the points in
red) and comparatively stable center and
north raise alarm (yellow and green points
respectively). Since the onset of fighting,
there has been a surge in mortality rates
above the commonly used thresholds for a
crisis situation of 1/10,000/day (CDR)
and 2/10,000/day (U5DR), reflecting a
critical health situation (encircled). In
regions less affected by frequent conflict
in the center and north, mortality rates
have remained poor or acceptable but
have come close to reaching emergency
thresholds.
The magnitude of the death rates is
high but the fact that the severity has
remained elevated since 2006 is unusual
for any humanitarian crisis. The high rates
coincide with a series of spiraling political
events: division within the transitional
government, recurrent episodes of heavy
fighting, the exit of NGOs, the entry of
Ethiopian troops, and military engage-
ment of peacekeepers. These ruinous
events have created the ‘‘shrinking and
deteriorating’’ operating environment that
has confounded relief efforts [7].
With respect to space, analyses can
illustrate the geographic focus of the critical
situation. Mapping of data indicates the
severity of the most recent CDR values by
areas surveyed (Figure 3). In some areas,
CDR has bordered on 2/10,000/day,
indicating a situation that is out of control.
In the southern and central regions, which
are heavily affected by conflict, death rates
above thresholdhavepersisted.Thehighest
rates are found primarily in the southern
regions of Juba, Shabelle, Bay, and Gedo.
Of note, Mogadishu and Kismaayo, locat-
ed in Lower Juba and the base of the Union
of Islamic Courts, are located nearby and
are regular sites of clashes.
In Somalia, riverine agriculture and
pastoral husbandry strategies are integral
to the economy [1]. These agricultural
livelihood groups use distinct strategies and
assets that direct them across internal
borders. During persistent internal conflict,
agricultural livelihoods may become unsus-
tainable. The FSAU monitors mortality
among these livelihood groups; they are
represented on the map by the nonuniform
strips that cross provincial borders
(Figure 3). Many of these areas clearly
represent narrow corridors of stress.
Interpreting Causes of Death
Survey respondents in the Shabelle and
Gedo regions reported that killings or
Figure 1. Crude death rates in Somalia, 2002–2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000108.g001
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death for CDR estimates above the crisis
threshold. Reports noted that this influx of
violent deaths coincided with episodes of
violence in Mogadishu and internal dis-
placement to these southern regions.
However, in other regions and time
periods, malnutrition, preventable disease,
and birth complications predominated as
the main reported causes of child and
adult deaths. These are well-known symp-
toms of poorly functioning health, public
health, water, and sanitation systems; mass
displacement; and ruptures in the food
supply. Most of the population depends on
food aid, health systems are localized with
little central authority, and there is a
vacuum of primary health care workers
[12]. A widespread epidemic of clinically
diagnosed acute watery diarrhea/cholera
across the center and south throughout
2007 and 2008 is further proof of the need
to reinforce basic systems [13].
Focusing on Public Health
Priorities
Concise overviews of field survey data
can be used as quantitative evidence to
identify priorities for the humanitarian
response and to monitor the impact of
operations. The populations most in need
of relief are clearly pooled around specific
regions in the south. However, a key
determinant of the magnitude of need
has been the restrictions on humanitarian
access in this region. While aid would be
more effective if targeted toward these
populations, safe and unhindered human-
itarian access has been elusive.
Perhaps most importantly, we note that
the main causes of death mirror those of
other complex emergencies. Deaths due to
malnutrition and preventable disease will
continue to predominate over those due to
violence. Crumbling public health systems
and limited humanitarian relief exacerbate
the situation. Vaccine-preventable diseases
continue to be a leading cause of death
and morbidity among children [13]. The
lack of centralized delivery to communities
through a working public health system
necessitates ad-hoc delivery to accessible
populations and results in less than 40% of
children having full immunization cover-
age (DPT3). Intensified programs, such as
the WHO/UNICEF’s successful Measles
Catchup Campaign (2005–2007), con-
ducted deep within southern communities,
could greatly prevent child mortality levels
from rising further.
It is clear that political realities will
continue to either impede or facilitate
opportunities for humanitarian interven-
tion. The recent withdrawal of the Ethio-
pian troops may open the window for
genuine intra-Somali dialogue. While po-
litical negotiations take place, the need for
food and very basic health care continues
to grow in the southern and central
provinces. The Deyr 2008–2009 season
rains were below normal, deepening
severe drought and the pastoral food crises
in the central regions. Fortunately, anoth-
er child and mother health campaign
launched by WHO/UNICEF in Decem-
ber 2008 endeavors to reach 1.5 million
children [14]. In the past, such health
interventions have been facilitated by local
leaders [15]. Even in such volatile con-
texts, well-resourced health strategies that
are delivered through local partners may
still provide effective delivery of preventa-
tive health care for women and children at
greatest risk. Although nearly 3 million
people will continue to need humanitarian
aid, our analyses indicate that the success
of these programs in the south is of high
importance. This reasoning is not only
based on the acute needs but it will also to
allow people to remain in their villages—a
lesson learnt from past similar situations
where displacement typically increased the
risk of mortality and morbidity.
Somalia presents a complex political
picture, and the international community’s
strategy in the last decade and a half has
not yielded encouraging results. The
memories of the serious failure of the
allied forces and the UN to restore order
in 1993–1995 are still rankling in both the
regional and international communities.
Peacekeepers and the military should not
have been sent then to solve a political
problem and they should not be sent now.
As Ethiopia retreats and a new parliament
is formed, the UN should broaden the
dialogue to include the leaders of the
Figure 2. Under-five death rates in Somalia, 2002–2008.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000108.g002
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doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000108.g003
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there to stay. The same mistakes of
excluding the local power brokers in
matters of health protection and waiting
until children die in food distribution lines
outside of Mogadishu should not be made
again.
In 1995, one of us argued that the failure
of humanitarian intervention during 1992
and 1993 should be a ‘‘lesson to the world’’
[16]. At that time, the international com-
munity was ready to provide nearly US$1.5
billionasemergencyassistance,inone year.
This was well above the amount they were
willing togiveasdevelopmentaidforthe10
previous years. Today, the international
community is once again ready to spend
copiously for policing the international
waters off the coast to prevent ransom
and the piracy of goods, but are less
prepared to spend a tenth of that amount
for avoiding severe famine and vaccine-
preventable disease among civilians in the
south. Indeed, death rates have now
reached levels close to those found among
populations displaced from Mogadishu
during the war in 1992 [17].
Mortality surveys have the potential to
highlight the progress of the humanitarian
operation, rather than merely to ‘‘chronicle
an on-going disaster’’ [18]. Therefore, we
have illustrated ways in which this data can
provide an evidence base for health prior-
ities in humanitarian assistance to ensure its
effectiveness in reducing human and eco-
nomic costs when resources are shrinking.
We would also like to underline the
consequences of neglecting the need for
social stabilization and long-term develop-
ment aid in favor of allowing a situation to
deteriorate until an emergency occurs or
the global economy is affected.
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